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INTRODUCTION 
With technology evolving at a dizzying pace and providing new 
opportunities to connect with others, the United States government has tried to 
stay ahead of Internet copyright infringers.  Of particular frustration to the 
government are websites such as Rojadirecta1 and myVidster.2  These sites, 
among many others, provide Internet users with the ability to stream 
unauthorized, copyrighted video from third parties directly to their computers.  
Seeking to take down the domains of these websites, the government withholds 
the site from any functionality.  But many of these pending cases have been 
dismissed before the courts could decide on the claims’ substantive merits.  
Assuming that these third-party linking websites would have otherwise met the 
threshold to be found liable for copyright infringement, each might possess a 
defense against their charges through the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA), specifically through its “safe harbor” exemptions in § 512.3  While 
the bulk of legal discussion on safe harbor defenses deals with the first three 
parts of § 512, the fourth—less invoked part of limitations on liability relating 
to material online—specifically provides an exemption for “information 
location tools,” provided they meet certain criteria.4 
This Comment will discuss the potential use of § 512(d) of the DMCA in 
connection with third-party video streaming websites, particularly the recent 
government seizures in Rojadirecta and litigation in myVidster.  First, the 
Comment will examine § 512(d) of the DMCA, the various elements that 
comprise the section, and the legislative intent behind its drafting.  Second, the 
Comment will focus directly on the actual knowledge requirement within § 
512(d)(1), and, in the absence of actual knowledge, the similarities in “red flag” 
knowledge to patent knowledge requirements.  Finally, it will address the state 
of case law regarding websites such as Rojadirecta and myVidster, and analyze 
whether third-party linking websites such as these can legitimately claim to be 
information location tools or whether this section provides too much latitude 
for copyright infringers. 
I.  THE LAW AND HISTORY OF THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS 
A.  Internet Service Provider Definitions and Liability 
Two definitions exist within the Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 512 
that define who qualifies as a “service provider” eligible for one of the safe 
 
1. ROJADIRECTA, http://www.rojadirecta.me/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
2. MYVIDSTER, http://www.myvidster.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
3. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
4. See id. § 512(d). 
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harbor exemptions.  The first is limited to § 512(a) and protects transitory 
digital network communications.5  In § 512(k)(1)(A), a service provider is 
defined as “an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of 
connections for digital online communications, between or among points 
specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to 
the content of the material sent or received.”6  This definition provides the 
working framework for the remaining three safe harbor exemptions.  More 
broadly defined, a service provider is “a provider of online services or network 
services, or the operator of facilities thereof.”7  This broader definition 
encompasses “services such as search engines, websites (including retail sites), 
hosting services, bulletin board and newsgroup operators.”8 
Tension also exists between the various liabilities for these service 
providers.  Traditionally, three distinct types of liability can be attached to 
copyright infringers: direct, contributory, and vicarious.  Direct infringement 
occurs when “[a]nyone . . . violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner.”9  The individual who violates those rights is directly liable for the 
infringement.  But for a variety of reasons, litigation of direct infringers is not 
as common as it is for secondary infringers, the intermediaries.10  Individuals 
or service providers who assist in direct infringement can be held contributorily 
or vicariously liable.  Contributory infringement occurs when “[o]ne who, with 
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes 
to the infringing conduct of another.”11  Vicarious liability occurs when “the 
defendant profits directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to 
supervise the direct infringer.”12  These distinct forms of common law liability, 
which will be covered in further detail later in the Comment, “continue to exist 
as before, unaffected by the DMCA.”13 
 
5. See id. § 512(a). 
6. Id. § 512(k)(1)(A). 
7. Id. § 512(k)(1)(B). 
8. 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT Chap. 21, § 21:85 (2013) (footnote omitted).  
See, e.g., CoStar, Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh 
Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
9. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006). 
10. See generally BRUCE E. BOYDEN, INTERNET LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 788 (2012) 
(“While the Internet and other digital technologies have expanded the ability of individuals to copy 
and distribute, they have not enhanced the ability to bring lawsuits against individuals. . . . Suing 
hundreds or thousands of individuals for myriad separate direct infringement actions is difficult and 
expensive.”). 
11. Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gershwin 
Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
12. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 n.9 (2005). 
13. 6 PATRY, supra note 8.  
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There does, however, exist some difference between the copyright 
infringement liability and common law causes of action.14  If a service provider 
does not qualify for one of the safe harbor exemptions, it may instead argue that 
the copyright holder “has failed to make out a common law cause of action for 
contributory infringement or vicarious liability.”15 
Additionally, a distinction exists between criminal and civil copyright 
infringement.  While this Comment does not address criminal copyright 
infringement,16 it is pleaded in the Rojadirecta case referenced in Section III(A).  
In short, “[a]ny person who willfully infringes a copyright . . . for purposes of 
commercial advantage”17 is criminally liable for copyright infringement.  
Additional provisions in § 506 account for the “reproduction or distribution . . . 
of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which 
have a total retail value of more than $1,000”18 and the distribution of work 
“being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a 
computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or 
should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution.”19  
But perhaps the most important distinction for the purposes of this Comment is 
that there is no secondary criminal copyright infringement.  Only direct 
infringers are held criminally liable. 
B.  Text of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 512 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is divided into several specific 
limitations on liability relating to material online.  Those who satisfy the 
elements for one of the safe harbor defenses are shielded from an award of 
monetary damages and often from injunctive relief.20  Each exemption 
functions independent of each other.  Failure to qualify for one exemption will 
not bar the party from asserting another exemption.  § 512(a) addresses 
“transitory digital network communications.”21  It specifically covers service 
providers that act as conduits for the transmission of copyrighted work without 
modification.22  The section allows for “a broad grant of immunity to service 
 
14. See id. 
15. Id. (The reverse is not true however.  If a service provider satisfies one of the safe harbor 
exemptions, the copyright owner cannot also make the provider liable for common law infringement). 
16. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006). 
17. Id. § 506(a)(1)(A). 
18. Id. § 506(a)(1)(B). 
19. Id. § 506(a)(1)(C). 
20. See id. § 512(j).  This immunity helps protect ISPs from fear of incurring undue liability 
that would strain or halt normal operation of doing business.  Additionally, it can hold off mounting 
costs of litigation. 
21. Id. § 512(a).  
22. See id. 
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providers whose connection with the material is transient.”23  The Internet 
service provider (ISP) cannot actively select the recipients24 or the material to 
be transmitted,25 or it risks losing immunity.  The computers pass along the 
transient information among users, and if these intervening computers must 
block indirectly infringing material, “[t]he Internet as we know it simply cannot 
exist.”26  This exemption is relatively straightforward and easy to identify, 
especially in comparison to both § 512(c) and § 512(d). 
§ 512(b) protects against system caching, or the creation of temporary 
copies of copyrighted work for quick network archival access.27  Quick access 
to these files allows for ISPs to prevent excessive network congestion and can 
be vital to the network’s continued performance.  Indeed, § 512(b) takes into 
account just how the Internet functions.  To avoid uninterrupted transmission, 
caching “reduces waiting time, and . . . service provider bandwidth loads” by 
sending the temporary or cached copy to the destination point instead of 
retrieving it from the original source again.28 
§ 512(c), one of the more litigated sections within § 512, protects ISPs from 
liability when information residing on systems or networks at the direction of a 
third-party user is infringing.29  Websites such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, 
and Flickr (among many others) allow users to store these copyrighted 
materials in such a manner where they are made publicly available, or at least 
amongst a select group of individuals that the user approves.  Pivotal to this 
third section’s limit on liability is a knowledge section that, for all purposes, 
functions nearly identical to the knowledge section in § 512(d). 
The final limit on liability in § 512 and the primary focus of this Comment 
is § 512(d), information location tools.30  Information location tools can include 
directories, hypertext links, pointers, and other vital means of communicating 
online.31  Further, section (d) states that a service provider will not be found 
liable “for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring or 
 
23. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007) (The court continued 
explaining its definition of “transient” communication: “When an individual clicks on an Internet link, 
his computer sends a request for the information.  The company receiving that request sends that 
request on to another computer, which sends it on to another. . . . In passing the information along, 
each intervening computer makes a short-lived copy of the data.”). 
24. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(3) (2006). 
25. Id. § 512(a)(1). 
26. Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d at 1116 (“Service providers are immune for transmitting all digital 
online communications, not just those that directly infringe.”). 
27. § 512(b). 
28. 6 PATRY, supra note 8. 
29. § 512(c). 
30. Id. § 512(d). 
31. See id. § 512(d). 
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linking users to an online location containing infringing material or infringing 
activity.”32  In order to obtain the immunity, the ISP must not receive any 
financial benefit “directly attributable to the infringing activity,” when the ISP 
has the “right and ability to control” the activity.33  In all cases where the ISP 
has been notified of claimed infringement, the ISP must respond “expeditiously 
to remove, or disable access to” the infringing material.34 
But the immunity is also conditioned on satisfaction of three knowledge 
factors.  The ISP must not have “actual knowledge that the material or activity 
is infringing.”35  Second, in the absence of actual knowledge, the ISP must not 
“be aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent.”36  Finally, the ISP must, upon “obtaining such knowledge or 
awareness, act expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”37  
Section II of this Comment, together with a deeper discussion of the legislative 
and procedural history of § 512(d), will more closely examine how the “actual 
knowledge” requirement is defined. 
C.  Legislative History of § 512(d) 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and by extension § 512’s safe 
harbor exemptions, came in response to several external stimuli.  The first was 
the further implementation of World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) sponsored copyright agreements, an extension of the United States’ 
recent adherence to the Berne Convention.38  The second, arguably more 
pressing, stimulus was the changing nature of the Internet and digital 
environments, making the reproduction of copyrighted works easier and more 
efficient than ever.39  Indeed, users of the Internet or other electronic media can 
now “send and retrieve perfect reproductions of copyrighted material easily and 
nearly instantaneously, to or from locations around the world.”40  While the 
advances in technology would undoubtedly benefit copyright owners and 
consumers, it would also “facilitate pirates who aim to destroy the value of 
American intellectual property.”41  To address these concerns, WIPO hosted a 
 
32. Id. § 512(d). 
33. Id. § 512(d)(2).  This is a particularly difficult provision to interpret, similar to one in § 
512(c).  It creates confusion because of its conflicting connections with common law liability.  It will 
be handled in more depth in Section II. 
34. Id. § 512(d)(3). 
35. Id. § 512(d)(1)(A). 
36. Id. § 512(d)(1)(B). 
37. Id. § 512(d)(1)(C). 
38. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 9 (1998). 
39. See id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
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conference in December 1996 to create two treaties adopted by consensus by 
over 150 countries: the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty.42 
Specific to this Comment, the second part of House Report 105 addresses 
Internet copyright infringement liability in Title II of the DMCA.43  One of the 
primary concerns in drafting Title II was to “[preserve] strong incentives for 
service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with 
copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked 
environment.”44  Of equal concern was the desire to create “greater certainty to 
service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may 
occur in the course of their activities.”45  By striking a balance between the oft 
competing interests of the copyright owners, ISPs, and third-party consumers, 
Congress hoped § 512 of the DMCA would have enough teeth to protect 
copyright owners, without sacrificing either freedom of speech or the 
predictability of liability for ISPs. 
To that end, the adopted § 512(d) covers situations where “information 
location tools refer or link users to an on-line location containing infringing 
material or infringing activity.”46  Congress also defined in their House Report 
that the term “infringing activity” would represent “wrongful activity that is 
occurring at the location to which the users linked or referred by the information 
location tool.”47  But this definition holds true whether the infringement “is 
technically deemed to have occurred at that location or at the location where 
the material is received.”48  Additionally, Congress included a list of valid 
information location tools that would satisfy § 512(d): 
[A] directory or index of on-line sites or material, such as a search 
engine that identifies pages by specified criteria; a reference to outside 
material, such as a list of recommended sites; a pointer that stands for 
an Internet location or address; and hypertext links, which allows users 
to access material without entering its address.49 
The Report goes on to explain that the § 512(d) safe harbor would restrict 
 
42. Id. See generally WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121; WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203. 
43. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49 (1998). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 49–50. 
46. Id. at 56. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 56–57. 
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the liability of an ISP that “refers or links users to an on-line location containing 
infringing material or activity” by using information location tools.50  While the 
knowledge component of § 512(d) will be addressed more thoroughly in the 
next section of the Comment, Congress identified concerns raised by ISPs that 
they may be “disqualified from the safe harbor based solely on evidence that it 
had viewed the infringing Internet site.”51  The fear became that websites with 
human editors would expose themselves to undue liability unintentionally.  If 
there existed a cooling effect on edited information location tools because of 
the exposure to liability, online directories that assisted Internet users in 
identifying and locating information on the Internet would be permanently 
impacted.52  The solution to this concern resides with the actual knowledge 
component in both § 512(c) and § 512(d). 
II.  ACTUAL AND RED FLAG KNOWLEDGE 
A.  Actual Knowledge 
Most of the focus on “actual knowledge” in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act’s DMCA § 512 safe harbor provisions stems from § 512(c).53  § 
512(c) is fundamentally very similar in evaluating the component of actual 
knowledge to § 512(d).  In fact, sections (c) and (d) vary only superficially 
when discussing what constitutes actual knowledge.  Courts generally presume 
that “similar statutes should be interpreted similarly,” with the similarity of the 
language being the determinative factor in evaluating the similar statutes.54  
Each safe harbor provision is divided into three subsections.  The first 
subsection of each requires that the ISP not possess actual knowledge of the 
infringing material.55  The only change between the two merely differentiates 
where the infringing work is held.  The identical second subsections of both (c) 
and (d) address whether an ISP, in the absence of actual knowledge, may be 
otherwise aware of infringing activities.56  The final subsections of (c) and (d) 
are also identical and provide for what an ISP should do once it has obtained 
 
50. Id. at 57. 
51. Id. 
52. See id. 
53. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006). 
54. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 718 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(quoting United States v. Sioux, 362 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
55. Compare § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (“does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity 
using the material on the system or network is infringing”), with § 512(d)(1)(A) (“does not have actual 
knowledge that the material or activity is infringing”). 
56. “[I]n the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent.” § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii); § 512(d)(1)(B). 
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actual knowledge or awareness of circumstances for infringement.57 
§ 512 is not the most clearly written of copyright statutes.  Courts have tried 
tackling the actual knowledge components of §§ 512(c)–(d) and interpreting 
the fine distinctions between them.  As previously mentioned, most case law 
centers on § 512(c), but because of their similarity in structure, courts have 
applied the same interpretations to the language of both sections.  In A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that “specific infringing 
material” that the operator failed to remove could constitute infringement.58  
But “absent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a 
computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement” just 
for the inherent structure of the computer system.59 
One of the most recent high profile cases involving the safe harbor 
provisions is Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.60  Plaintiffs from Viacom, the 
English Premier League, and various television and movie studios appealed a 
summary judgment decision from the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York in favor of YouTube regarding an assortment 
of direct and contributory copyright infringement claims.61 
Specific to this Comment, the court examined the issue of actual 
knowledge.  The district court found that YouTube had received “insufficient 
notice of the particular infringements”62 and lacked “actual knowledge” or 
“aware [ness] of facts or circumstances”63 that would prevent an ISP from 
claiming safe harbor protection under § 512(c)(1)(A).  But importantly, the 
district court held that § 512(c)(1)(A) refers to “knowledge of specific and 
identifiable infringements.”64  The Second Circuit affirmed this holding for 
several reasons.  First, knowledge by itself is not enough to remove the safe 
harbor protection of § 512(c)–(d), provided the ISP acts to remove or disable 
the material “expeditiously.”65  The court places an emphasis on the fact that 
the expeditious activity is to “remove or disable ‘the material’ at issue.”66  The 
defendants argue this interpretation neglects what is termed the “red flag” 
 
57. “[U]pon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable 
access to, the material.” § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii); § 512(d)(1)(C).  
58. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
59. Id. at 1021. 
60. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
61. Id. at 25–26. 
62. Id. 
63. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
64. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. 718 F. Supp. 2d. 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
65. See 676 F.3d at 30 (2d Cir. 2012); § 512(c)–(d). 
66. 676 F.3d at 31. 
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knowledge of § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) and § 512(d)(1)(B).67 
B.  Red Flag Knowledge and Its Patent Roots 
Red flag knowledge arises out of facts and circumstances.68  In the Second 
Circuit’s Viacom opinion, the plaintiffs tried to argue that the usage of the 
phrase “facts or circumstances” was not intended by Congress to limit red flag 
knowledge to one type of knowledge and thereby “[require] less specificity” 
than actual knowledge.69  But this could not be further from reality.  “[N]o court 
has embraced the contrary proposition . . . that the red flag provision ‘requires 
less specificity’ than the actual knowledge provision.”70 
Much of red flag knowledge case law comes from patent law.  In 2011, the 
United States Supreme Court decided Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB 
S.A., a patent case revolving around a “cool-touch” deep fryer, but that also 
addresses red flag knowledge.71  In the 1980’s, SEB invented and patented a 
“cool-touch” deep fryer.72  But a U.S. competitor of SEB asked a Hong Kong 
supplier, Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd., to “supply it with deep fryers meeting 
certain specifications.”73  Pentalpha purchased a SEB fryer in Hong Kong, but, 
because of its sale in a foreign market, the fryer did not have any U.S. patent 
markings.74  Despite being directly copied from SEB’s design, Pentalpha had 
an attorney complete a “right-to-use study.”75  Pentalpha went on to supply its 
infringing design for sale in the United States, prompting the lawsuit. 
The Supreme Court held that “deliberate indifference to a known risk” is 
not an appropriate defense to infringement.76  Pentalpha “was indisputably 
aware that its customers were selling its product in [the United States].”77  
Pentalpha demonstrated “willful blindness” by making conscious steps “to 
avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said 
to have actually known the critical facts.”78  Indeed, the facts and circumstances 
surrounding Pentalpha’s development of their fryer were subjective enough to 
determine red flag knowledge of their infringement. 
 
67. See id.; see also § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii); § 512(d)(1)(B). 
68. See generally § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii); § 512(d)(1)(B). 
69. 676 F.3d at 32. 
70. Id. at 32. 
71. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
72. See id. at 2063–64. 
73. Id. at 2064. 
74. See id. 
75. Id. (“Pentalpha refrained from telling the attorney that its design was copied directly from 
SEB’s.”). 
76. Id. at 2068. 
77. Id. at 2070. 
78. Id. at 2070–71. 
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C.  Subjective vs. Objective: Actual vs. Red Flag Knowledge 
Actual and red flag knowledge cannot and should not be viewed as “specific 
and generalized knowledge”.79  Actual knowledge, as it appears in § 
512(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 512(d)(1)(A) is commonly used to “denote subjective 
belief.”80  Actual knowledge provisions, thus, require that the ISP 
“subjectively” know of specific infringement.81  Like actual knowledge, red 
flag knowledge must also be specific to individual instances of infringement.  
But the red flag knowledge provisions require the ISP to be “subjectively aware 
of facts that would have made the specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious 
to a reasonable person.”82 
The Second Circuit in Viacom acknowledges a relatively “limited body of 
case law,” but nevertheless, finds support for its interpretation of the two 
knowledge provisions.83  In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners 
LLC, the Ninth Circuit examined § 512(c) with a copyright infringement case 
against Veoh Networks.84  As with the Viacom case, the court in Shelter Capital 
held that actual knowledge required the same “specific knowledge of particular 
infringing activity.”85  Similarly, the court relieves the burden of “determining 
whether materials are actually illegal” on an ISP.86  The Viacom court also cites 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, stating that despite being aware of 
infringing occurring at some level, there must be some “specific ‘red flag’ 
knowledge with respect to any particular link.”87 
III.  APPLYING § 512(D) TO THE ROJADIRECTA AND MYVIDSTER CASES 
Courts continue to grapple with how best to apply the various exemptions 
of § 512.  While prominent cases such as Shelter Capital and Viacom have 
helped shape the case law surrounding the safe harbor exemptions, many more 
cases that could have implications on ISP immunity are either dismissed prior 
to a decision on the merits or decided on other grounds.  Two such recent cases 
are the focus of the remainder of this Comment: the civil forfeiture of the 
 
79. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012). 
80. Id. (“[T]he belief held by the defendant need not be reasonable in order for it to 
defeat . . . actual knowledge.” (quoting U.S. v. Quinones, 635 F.3d 590, 602 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
81. 676 F.3d at 31. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners L.L.C, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011). 
Veoh Networks is a video-hosting service not unlike YouTube. 
85. Id. at 1037. 
86. Id. at 1038 (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
87. 676 F.3d at 32 (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 645 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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Rojadirecta domain name and the myVidster litigation.  By looking at these two 
examples, the potential emerges that the knowledge components of § 512(d) 
may be too easily satisfied and provide too much latitude for infringing ISPs to 
obtain immunity. 
A.  The Rojadirecta Takedown 
Rojadirecta is a website that is solely owned by the limited liability 
company Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. (Puerto 80), based out of Arteixo, Spain.88  
Puerto 80 is incorporated under the laws of Spain and owns both the 
rojadirecta.org and rojadirecta.com domain names.89  Both websites were 
registered with GoDaddy.com, Inc., a United States company located in 
Scottsdale, Arizona.90  Puerto 80 also owns the domain name rojadirecta.me.91  
The Rojadirecta site “hosts ‘forums’ in which users can post messages 
concerning sports, politics, and other topics.”92  Rojadirecta proved to be 
enormously popular.  According to the web traffic metric service Alexa.com, 
as of or about January 27, 2011, Rojadirecta.org was the 2,380th most popular 
website in the world and the 119th most popular in Spain.93  Using the same 
service, Rojadirecta.com was the 2,326th most popular website in the world and 
the 109th most popular website in Spain.94  Additionally, between its .com and 
.org domain names, Rojadirecta increased the number of monthly unique 
visitors dramatically from February 2010 to November and December 2010.95 
But more importantly, Rojadirecta is a “linking” website.96  The website 
provides “links to daily live sporting events and Pay-Per-View events, as well 
as downloadable broadcasts of sporting events or Pay-Per-View events that had 
been previously aired.”97  The main homepage for Rojadirecta consists of 
 
88. See Petition for Release of Seized Property, at 1, Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U v. United States 
(2011) (No. 13 Civ. 3983), available at https://www.eff.org/files/Petition%20for%20Release%20of
%20Seized%20Goods%20Final.pdf. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. 
91. ROJADIRECTA, supra note 1.  
92. Petition for Release of Seized Goods, supra note 88, at 1. 
93. Verified Amended Complaint, at 12–13, United States v. Rojadirecta.org,  (No. 11 CV. 
4139, 2012 WL 2869487 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)) (this metric service functions similar to that of the 
traditional Nielsen television ratings service, by measuring the amount of visitors relative to other 
websites on the Internet). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. (Compete.com, a web page analytics service, calculated that Rojadirecta.org went from 
44,623 to 96,986 monthly unique viewers from February to December 2010 while Rojadirecta.com 
increased from 67,476 to 99,316 monthly unique viewers from February to November 2010). 
96. Id. at 8. “Linking websites generally collect and catalog links to files on third-party websites 
that contain illegal copies of copyrighted content.” Id. at 6. 
97. Id. at 9. 
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several groupings of links for viewing, including “‘Today On Internet TV’ . . . 
‘Download Last Full Matches’ . . . and ‘Last Video Highlights.’”98  These 
groupings include links to a wide range of sporting events including tennis, 
basketball, baseball, hockey, college athletics, cricket, rugby, and 
soccer/football.99 
The United States government, through the Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) investigative agency known as U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE),100 began seizing 150 domain names of 
commercial websites “engaged in the illegal sale and distribution of counterfeit 
goods and copyrighted works” in November 2011.101  This operation, together 
with the Department of Justice, FBI, and the ICE-led National Intellectual 
Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center) was known as “Operation In 
Our Sites.”102  Among the websites seized by ICE were rojadirecta.org and 
rojadirecta.com.103  On January 31, 2011, the U.S. government seized both 
domains and shortly after filed for the forfeiture of those same web addresses.104 
Puerto 80 petitioned for the release of the seized domain names, but was 
able to maintain the use of foreign domain names such as rojadirecta.me.105  
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), together with the Center for 
Democracy and Technology and Public Knowledge, filed an amicus brief 
supporting Puerto 80.106  But in August 2011, United States District Court 
Judge Paul Crotty denied Puerto 80’s petition, arguing that the seizure of the 
domain names did not violate the First Amendment of the Constitution.107  
Judge Crotty disputed the Puerto 80’s allegations that, “in seizing the domain 
names, the [g]overnment has suppressed the content in the ‘forums’ on its 
 
98. Id. at 10. 
99. See generally ROJADIRECTA, supra note 1. 
100. See generally Overview, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Mar. 2, 
2014). 
101. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FEDERAL COURTS ORDER SEIZURE OF 150 WEBSITE DOMAINS 
INVOLVED IN SELLING COUNTERFEIT GOODS AS PART OF DOJ, ICE HSI AND FBI CYBER MONDAY 
CRACKDOWN (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/November/11-ag-1540.html. 
102. See id. 
103. See Verified Amended Complaint, supra note 93, at 1. 
104. ROJADIRECTA, The U.S. Government withdraws complaint against the Rojadirecta 
domains and the Court orders their return, ROJADIRECTA BLOG, (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://blog.rojadirecta.me/. 
105. See generally Petition for Release of Seized Goods, supra note 88.  See also Nate 
Anderson, Government admits defeat, gives back seized Rojadirecta domains, ARS TECHNICA, 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/government-goes-0-2-admits-defeat-in-rojadirecta-
domain-forfeit-case/. 
106. Ernesto, Domain Seizures Do Not Violate Free Speech, U.S. Court Rules, TORRENT 
FREAK, http://torrentfreak.com/domain-seizures-does-not-violate-free-speech-110805/. 
107. Id. 
WLEKLINSKI FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/27/2014  4:02 PM 
2014] SEARCHING FOR AN OUT 471 
 
websites. . . . The main purpose of the Rojadirecta websites, however, is to 
catalog links to the copyrighted athletic events—any argument to the contrary 
is clearly disingenuous.”108  Additionally, he held that the burden of the seizures 
was not too impactful, as the alternative foreign domains were still available, 
even to those who may not have known of the seizures.109 
Despite the Southern District of New York ruling on the matter, almost 
nineteen months after the domain names were seized, the United States 
government withdrew its complaint and the court ordered their return.110  Dated 
August 29, 2012, the dismissal letter does not offer a rationale as to why the 
government dropped the forfeiture case.111  One proposed rationale for the 
withdrawal is the government’s inability to prosecute Puerto 80 for criminal 
infringement.112  The distinction rests with two problems in the case.  The first 
problem is that, in order to obtain the government’s desired forfeiture result, 
Puerto 80 would have to be found liable for § 506 criminal copyright 
infringement.113  § 506 states that “[a]ny person who willfully infringes a 
copyright . . . for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain” 
will be held criminally liable.114  Importantly, the specific wording of the statute 
provides criminal liability only for direct infringers.  Nowhere in § 506 does 
secondary liability for copyright infringement apply.  The related second 
problem is that Puerto 80 did not copy anything.115  “[H]yperlinking per se does 
not constitute direct copyright infringement because there is no copying. . . .”116  
Nevertheless, no substantive ruling was made regarding secondary liability for 
service providers. 
 
108. Order at 4, United States v. Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U., No. 11 Civ. 4139 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 
4, 2011). 
109. See id at 3. 
110. The U.S. Government withdraws complaint against the Rojadirecta domains and the Court 
orders their return, ROJADIRECTA (BLOG), http://blog.rojadirecta.me/. 
111. See Re: United States of America v. Rojadireca.org, et al. Letter of dismissal. (August 29, 
2012). 
112. See generally Mike Masnick, Rojadirecta Argues That The Justice Department Is Making 
Up Laws; Has No Legal Basis To Forfeit Its Domain, TECHDIRT, (Aug. 8, 2011, 7:42 AM),  
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110806/00013915420/rojadirecta-argues-that-justice-department
-is-making-up-laws-has-no-legal-basis-to-forfeit-its-domain.shtml. 
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006). 
114. Id. § 506(a)(1)(A). 
115. Mike Masnick, Rojadirecta Argues That The Justice Department Is Making Up Laws; Has 
No Legal Basis To Forfeit Its Domain, TECHDIRT (Aug. 8, 2011, 7:42 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110806/00013915420/rojadirecta-argues-that-justice-department
-is-making-up-laws-has-no-legal-basis-to-forfeit-its-domain.shtml.  
116. Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1202 n. 12 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
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B.  The myVidster Case: Flava Works v. Gunter 
Flava Works, Inc., an adult entertainment company based in Miami, 
Florida,117 “specializes in the production and distribution of videos of black 
men engaged in homosexual acts.”118  Neither the court nor the defendant 
contended that the videos produced by Flava Works were illegal or counter to 
any obscenity law.119  In order to legally access Flava Works’ videos, the user 
must first pay an upfront fee or “pay wall” and agree “not to copy, transmit, 
sell, etc. the video.”120  Only paid subscribers are, however, able to download 
the videos for “personal, noncommercial use.”121 
myVidster is a “social video sharing and bookmarking site” that allows 
users to “collect and share . . . videos [found] on the web.”122  It was created, 
owned, and operated by Marques Rondale Gunter, who also owns the domain 
name registration.123  Users are also able to browse and “follow video 
collections from other users using myVidster.”124  Once a myVidster member 
finds a video they wish to share, the user chooses whether to make the videos 
available to other members.125  When a “bookmark” is received, myVidster then 
“automatically requests the video’s ‘embed code’ from the server that 
hosts . . . the video.”126  This “embed code” is used by the website to make the 
video “appear to be on myVidster’s site.”127  The code takes the form of a 
“thumbnail” that, when clicked, will connect the viewer’s computer to the 
server, storing the file and playing the video.128  While it may appear the video 
is on the myVidster website, the viewer is actually watching the video straight 
from the server storing the file.129  The “frame” surrounding the videos contains 
advertisements that help myVidster pay for its services.130  The “bookmarked” 
 
117. Complaint at 3, Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter (2010) (No. 11-3190), available at 
http://flavaworks.com/legal/files/10%2010%2012%20Myvidster%20Complaint.pdf. 
118. Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2012). 
119. Id. at 756.  The court spends a bit of time discussing obscenity. Id.  Stating that 
“[a]cceptance of an obscenity defense would fragment copyright enforcement, protecting registered 
materials in a certain community while . . . authorizing pirating in another locale.” Id. “In pari delicto” 
is then raised as a potential question, but quickly dismissed. Id. 
120. Id. (quoting Flava Works’ terms of use). 
121. Id. (quoting Flava Works’ terms of use). 
122. Frequently Asked Questions, MYVIDSTER, http://www.myvidster.com/docs/help (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
123. See Complaint supra note 117, at 4.  
124. Id. at 19. 
125. See 689 F.3d at 756. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. (the “thumbnail” is a small picture or screen shot of the video for display purposes). 
129. See id. 
130. See id. 
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video is not hosted on myVidster’s website.131 
Flava Works filed for and was granted a preliminary injunction for 
copyright infringement by the district court against myVidster.132  Several 
businesses filed amicus briefs in the Seventh Circuit alongside Flava Works, 
including the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), Google, and 
Facebook.133  But Judge Posner, however, found the district court erred in 
granting the injunction.  Drawing precedent from eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C.,134 a patents case, Judge Posner held that likelihood of success is not the 
sole requirement for granting an injunction.135  Likelihood of success, however, 
was the only requirement discussed in the district court’s decision, and so Judge 
Posner restricted his procedural focus there.136 
The stakes were high for ISPs.  myVidster had responded to § 512(i) 
takedown notices, but “[went] no further.”137  The EFF filed an amicus brief 
claiming that “[c]ourts have emphasized that . . . § 512(i) does not create any 
duty on the part of service providers to police their sites or otherwise make 
determinations on claims of copyright infringement.”138  Judge Posner’s ruling 
on the contributory negligence claims could have dramatically impacted 
existing case law on “inline links” and even the “server test.”139 
Judge Posner reversed the district court opinion and found in favor of 
myVidster on several grounds related to the contributory infringement claims.  
Though myVidster is “not just adding a frame around the video screen that the 
visitor is watching,” so long as the viewer of the video does not make a copy 
 
131. See id. 
132. Id at 754. (the finding by the district judge was that a trier of fact would likely find 
myVidster to be a contributory infringer). 
133. Eriq Gardner, MPAA Lines Up with Porn Studio in Steamy Copyright Dispute, THE 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 9, 2012, 1:41 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/mpaa-
flava-works-myvidster-google-facebook-309595.  Google and Facebook in particular were alarmed by 
the district court’s treatment of social bookmarking websites as direct infringers.  If myVidster’s 
preliminary injunction were to remain, the impact on licensing and Internet business would be severe. 
See id.  
134. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
135. See Flava Works, Inc., 689 F.3d at 755 (citing Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 
989 (9th Cir. 2011); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F. 3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (supporting the Court’s conclusion 
that the eBay standard for preliminary injunctions can apply to a copyright case as well)). 
136. See Flava Works, Inc., 689 F.3d at 755. 
137. Gardner, supra note 133; See also Complaint, supra note 117.  
138. Gardner, supra note 133.  
139. See generally Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(recognizing the reality of how the internet worked, the Ninth Circuit struck a balance between 
communication dissemination and copyright interests by deciding Google never really hosts the images 
and thus cannot be a direct infringer); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 
(2d Cir. 2001) (defendant Corley claims “inline linking” is not trafficking or distributing files, but 
merely information as to where information is located). 
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of the video, the viewer is “not violating the copyright owner’s exclusive 
right . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies.”140  Judge Posner then 
made the analogy of a viewer of an infringing video to an individual who steals 
a copyrighted book from a library to read it.141  Both are “bad thing[s] to 
do . . . but it is not copyright infringement.”142 
Judge Posner specifically addressed the safe harbor provisions of § 512(d), 
but then dismissed their applicability rather quickly as “myVidster is not an 
infringer, at least in the form of copying or distributing copies of copyrighted 
work.”143  The court’s response was that there was no evidence that myVidster 
encouraged the infringers to upload the videos.144  If myVidster had invited or 
induced the infringers to upload what it knew to be copyrighted material, then 
the website would be liable for contributory infringement.145  But the court 
found no evidence to this point.  “myVidster knows that some of the videos 
bookmarked on its site infringe copyright, but that doesn’t make it a facilitator 
of copying.”146  Viewers of the infringing material were not paying for the right 
to do so, and were “therefore not encouraging infringement.”147  Judge Posner 
did posit that the DMCA does refer to linking users to locations with infringing 
material and the possibility that it could expand the definition of contributory 
copyright infringement.148  But again, he granted that Congress likely intended 
to make the safe harbor provisions of § 512 “as capacious as possible” in order 
to help ISPs avoid undue liability.149 
C.  Do They Qualify for the Information Location Tools Exemption? 
In order to determine whether either Rojadirecta or myVidster qualify for 
the § 512(d) safe harbor exemption for information location tools, an ISP must 
first satisfy whether the infringing service meets its statutory definition.  
According to § 512(d) and supported by the corresponding second part of 
House Report NO. 105-551, an information location tool can be: 
[A] directory of on-line sites or material, such as a search engine that 
 
140. Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 
106(1)(3)). 
141. Id. at 758. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. See id. 
145. See id.; See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 930 
(2005). 
146. Flava Works, Inc., 689 F.3d at 759. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 758. 
149. Id. 
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identifies pages by specified criteria; reference to other on-line material, 
such as a list of recommended sites; a pointer that stands for Internet 
locations or addresses; and hypertext link, which allows users to access 
material without entering its address.150 
Each of the websites in question meets the structural characteristics of an 
information location tool.  Rojadirecta is largely two components, both which 
would qualify as an information location tool.  The first is an online forum with 
message boards for users to register, comment, and share links to live sporting 
events.151  This directory or index provides user imputed lists of recommended 
sites.  The second is the hotlinks section on the home page.152  As the name 
suggests, these are direct hypertext links to upcoming live events.  Similarly, 
myVidster is a website structured with links to view videos.153  The site is 
organized into “collections,” which are user homepages with bookmarked, in-
line links to the desired videos.  The website also has a search function, 
allowing the user to search across myVidster, within a given collection or for a 
particular user or group.  Followers are listed on the right-hand side of the page. 
But just because an ISP meets the structural requirements necessary to 
classify as an information location tool does not mean the ISPs can obtain safe 
harbor protection under § 512(d).  myVidster, for instance, would more than 
likely maintain its § 512(d) safe harbor protection.  The website is primarily a 
“user-community and it is not the website’s sole purpose to link to copyrighted 
material.”154  Therefore, it may qualify for § 512(d) statutory immunity, 
provided of course, that it responds expeditiously to takedown requests sent to 
the ISP.155  The website, while obviously recognizing that copyright 
infringement is possible on its site, has a structure that allows for copyright 
owners to not only search and find their work, but also to easily report 
infringement via a link at the bottom of the page.156  Provided that myVidster 
either does not have actual knowledge of a specific infringement or fails to act 
in a timely manner to remove or disable the material, the ISP is likely protected 
from contributory copyright infringement. 
myVidster must overcome two hurdles in order to feel confident in its safe 
 
150. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, p 56–57 (1998). 
151. ROJADIRECTA, Forum, http://forum.rojadirecta.es/forum.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
152. See ROJADIRECTA, supra note 1. 
153. See MYVIDSTER, supra note 2. 
154. Jason J. Lunardi, Note, Guerilla Video: Potential Copyright Liability for Websites That 
Index Links to Unauthorized Streaming Content, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 
1077, 1124 (2009). 
155. Id. at 1125. 
156. See MYVIDSTER, Copyright Complaints, http://www.myvidster.com/docs/copyright (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
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harbor protection.  The first is the red flag knowledge provision of § 
512(d)(1)(B).  As was covered earlier, mere knowledge that infringement may 
be occurring is neither constructive nor specific enough to cause myVidster to 
become “subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific 
infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”157  The second 
hurdle, while not an emphasis of this Comment, is § 512(d)(2), the “financial 
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.”158 Advertisements 
accompany each page where a video is displayed.  Without the advertisements, 
myVidster’s financial structure would be radically different.  Is the sale of the 
advertisements alongside videos, many of which are owned by the collection 
owner, enough to remove § 512(d) protection?  That appears unlikely, 
especially considering YouTube’s success in overcoming § 512(c) challenges 
using a similar business model.  Paired with any failures to implement 
takedown notices or red flag knowledge violations, myVidster could incur 
problems. 
Rojadirecta, however, runs into more substantive issues in obtaining § 
512(d) protection.  Every link provided on their main page and many of the 
ones in the forums connect users to live copyrighted broadcasts of sporting 
events.  Unlike myVidster, which has a substantial volume of in-line linking to 
either user’s personal videos or non-copyrighted media, the very intention of 
Rojadirecta is to provide free access to otherwise unavailable copyrighted 
broadcasts.  If Rojadirecta were to receive and process every takedown it could 
receive, the site would likely be devoid of content.  Indeed, not only would 
Rojadirecta fail the actual knowledge provision, but it would likely fail the red 
flag knowledge provisions as well.  With enough recurring broadcasts, it would 
be objectively obvious to a reasonable person that Rojadirecta was aware of 
circumstances leading to contributory copyright infringement.  Rojadirecta 
would almost certainly fail both the subjective actual knowledge component 
and the objective red flag knowledge provision. 
Working in Rojadirecta’s favor, however, might be the lack of a “financial 
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.”159  The website is a free 
forum devoid of advertising.  The only corporate connections are links to “like” 
Rojadirecta on Facebook or to follow on Twitter.160  In fact, at the bottom of 
the Rojadirecta home page, there is a Creative Commons icon, which informs 
the user of what is permissible.161  It requires that all works must be attributed, 
 
157. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012). 
158. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(2) (2006). 
159. Id. 
160. See ROJADIRECTA, supra note 1. 
161. See Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.en (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).  Of particular 
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not used for commercial purposes, and cannot be altered in any way.162  In short, 
Rojadirecta might be able to qualify for § 512 immunity, but it would have a 
much harder path towards qualifying as an information location tool.  
Rojadirecta represents a gray area in § 512(d) precisely because it fails the 
knowledge components, but also fails to satisfy other traditionally glaring 
infringement red flags like financial incentives.  Should Rojadirecta have ever 
reached litigation, and not remained an ICE civil forfeiture case, it may have 
helped shape the outer of limits of § 512 exemptions. 
CONCLUSION 
§ 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act intended to provide 
additional levels of certainty and protection to ISPs, in order to properly balance 
the rights of copyright owners without either party sacrificing freedom of 
speech.  § 512(d) has the potential to provide too much latitude for websites 
and ISPs that allow users to provide links for third parties to stream infringing 
copyrightable material online.  While the sites themselves may be shielded from 
contributory, direct, or vicarious infringement, the fact remains that the ISPs, 
while not willfully blind to their behavior of their users, should be cautious of 
the knowledge requirements set forth in § 512(c)-(d), especially those regarding 
actual knowledge and red flag knowledge, being subjectively aware of 
infringements objectively obvious to the reasonable person. 
Given the current case law surrounding websites such as YouTube, a model 
resembling myVidster has a higher chance of being protected in court than the 
more obvious Rojadirecta.  § 512(d), due to its actual and red flag knowledge 
provisions, gives a great deal of flexibility to ISPs in shielding themselves from 
copyright infringement.  Nevertheless, as case law evolves on the matter, 
websites that, by their very nature, might potentially expose themselves to 
copyright infringement must stay alert to the ever-changing legal 
interpretations around them.  While ISPs may have latitude using the safe 
harbor exemptions, copyright owners, particularly broadcast and recording 
studios with the financial wherewithal to pursue such claims, will surely 
continue trying to narrow these exemptions to better protect their copyrighted 
products. 
KEVIN J. WLEKLINSKI* 
 
 
note, Rojadirecta’s website features the “most restrictive of [the] six main licenses,” allowing others 
the ability to download works and sharing them, provided users properly credit the source. This license 
also restricts the ability to change the downloaded works in any way or use them commercially.  About 
the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). 
162. Id. 
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